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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
V • < 
DOUGLAS R. ALBRETSEN, i 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
t Case No. 880154 
i Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and Theft, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(a)(i) (1978), in the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court properly admitted and 
published defendant's "mug shot" photograph into evidence for the 
purpose of rebutting defendant's challenge to the credibility of 
the victim's identification? 
2. Whether the testimony of the State's rebuttal 
witness to defendant's alibi was properly admitted when notice of 
the witness and his potential testimony was given to defendant as 
soon as was practicable? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann- S 77-14-2 (1982): 
77-14-2. Alibi—Notice requirements—WitneBB 
lists. (1) A defendant, whether or not 
written demand has been made, who intends to 
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less 
than ten days before trial or at such other 
time as the court may allow, file and serve 
on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in 
writing, of his intention to claim alibi. 
The notice shall contain specific information 
as to the place where the defendant claims to 
have been at the time of the alleged offense 
and, as particularly as is known to the 
defendant or his attorney, the names and 
addresses of the witnesses by whom he 
proposes to establish alibi. The prosecuting 
attorney, not more than five days after 
receipt of the list provided herein or at 
such other time as the court may direct, 
shall file and serve the defendant with the 
addresses, as particularly as are known to 
him, of the witnesses the state proposes to 
offer to contradict or impeach the 
defendant's alibi evidence. 
(2) The defendant and prosecuting 
attorney shall be under a continuing duty to 
disclose the names and addresses of 
additional witnesses which come to the 
attention of either party after filing their 
alibi witness lists. 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney 
fails to comply with the requirements of this 
section, the court may exclude evidence 
offered to establish or rebut alibi. 
However, the defendant may always testify on 
his own behalf concerning alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, 
waive the requirements of this section. 
Utah R. Evid. 403s 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b); 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Douglas R. Albretsen, was convicted of 
Aggravated Burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1978), and Theft, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978), in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412(a)(i) (1978), following a jury 
trial held August 4 and 5, 1987, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 11, 1987, Maureen Leavitt returned home from 
work at approximately 5:30-5:45 p.m. (T. 16). Leavitt, who has 
20/20 vision, was feeling good, with no strains or worries, when 
she arrived home that evening (T. 19). After entering the house, 
Leavitt went into the family room in order to look into the yard 
at"some recently-purchased flowers, pulled the drapes on the 
windows in that room and then started down the hall that led to 
the kitchen (T. 19-20). As she approached the end of the 
hallway, a man stepped from around the corner (T. 20). The man 
was approximately two feet from Leavitt and he had a wooden club 
raised in his hands (T. 21). The two of them looked at each 
other face-to-face for approximately three seconds, then he 
started to beat her with the club (T. 21-22). 
The first hit knocked Leavitt to the floor (T. 22). 
Although only semi-conscious, she continued to try to protect 
herself by raising her hand in defense, but the attacker 
continued to beat her until she finally lost consciousness (T. 
23-24). Leavitt suffered extensive injuries (T. 28-29) and was 
hospitalized for two days (T. 35). 
On May 14, 1987, Leavitt identified defendant as her 
attacker from a black binder containing 30-50 photographs 
provided by Detective Hutchison (T. 38-39). Upon identifying 
defendant's photo as that of her attacker, Leavitt stated to her 
husband that: "This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39). 
Subsequently, Detective Hutchison returned to Leavitt's 
home with a photo display of six pictures (T. 39; State's Exhibit 
8). Leavitt immediately and positively identified a second, more 
recent, picture of defendant as her attacker (T. 40, 56). At 
defendant's request Leavitt also attended a line-up, where she 
again identified defendant as her assailant (T. 42-43). 
On July 22, 1987, defendant filed a Notice of Intent to 
Rely on the Defense of Alibi as required by Utah Code Ann. S 77-
14^2(1) (1953, as amended) (R. 22). Brenda Davis and Cindy 
Edwards were both listed as alibi witnesses (T. 22). The State 
filed its Reply to Notice of Alibi on July 30, 1987 (R. 49-50). 
Officer Brandt Hutchison of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
was listed as State's rebuttal witness (R. 49). 
On the first day of trial, defendant objected to 
introduction of the loose-leaf binder of photographs and the 
photo array used by Leavitt to identify him (R. 51). After some 
discussion, the State agreed not to use the loose-leaf binder, 
and agreed to alter the photo display as stipulated before 
entering it as an exhibit (R. 51). 
At trial, on direct examination Leavitt testified about 
her identification of defendant as her attacker from the black 
binder containing 30-50 photographs, and from the six-picture 
photo display (T. 38-40). Referring to the photo display, the 
prosecutor asked Leavitt to place an "xM by the photograph which 
she selected as her assailant for Detective Hutchison and then 
moved for admission of the photo display as State's Exhibit 8 (T. 
39-41). Although defendant had no objection to the admission of 
the exhibit, counsel requested and the court ruled that it not be 
published at that time (R. 41). 
On cross examination, defendant's attorney had Leavitt 
repeat that when she identified defendant from the book of 
pictures, she told her husband: "This looks like the man that 
beat meM (T. 54). Defendant's attorney then questioned Leavitt 
about her subsequent identifications from the photo spread, the 
line-up, the preliminary hearing, and at the present time of 
trial, finally asking her to again repeat her initial statement 
tocher husband that* "This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 
54^56). 
On redirect examination Leavitt pointed out differences 
between the first photo from the black binder and the second 
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picture of defendant from the photo display (T. 56). 
Specifically, she explained that the second photograph appeared 
to be more recent (T. 56). 
After requesting that the jury be excused, the 
prosecutor moved for admission of the photo display as well as 
the picture of defendant he had removed from the black binder and 
altered to hide booking references (T. 67). Defendant objected 
to the admission of the photograph from the binder on the grounds 
that something had clearly been hidden from view and because the 
photograph is a mug shot (T. 67). The State argued that the 
photograph should be admitted for the specific purpose of 
identity and to clarify Leavitt's initial statement that: "This 
looks like the man that beat me" (T. 69). Defendant did not 
object to admission of the six-picture photo array. The court 
admitted the photo from the black binder, State's Exhibit 9, for 
purposes of identification (T. 70-71). The two exhibits were 
later published to the jury (T. 74). Defendant moved for a 
mistrial based on the admission of Exhibit 9 and the Court denied 
the motion (T. 79, 81). 
Defendant called Brenda Davis as an alibi witness (T. 
82). On May 27, 1987, prior to trial, Detective Hutchison 
contacted Brenda Davis and obtained a handwritten statement from 
Davis that claimed defendant was with her at the time of the 
crime (R. 213, 225, copy in Addendum). In part, Davis wrote that 
they had "gone up into the mountain for a ride, into [sic] 
Parlsey [sic] Way and Emingation [sic] Canyan [sic]H (R. 225). 
(Addendum A.) At trial, during cross examination, Davis more 
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fully described the route that she and defendant had taken 
through the canyons (T. 96). She stated that they first 
travelled up Parley's Way to the East Canyon turnoff (T. 96). 
From there they travelled over the mountain and came back down 
Emigration Canyon (R. 96-97). The State repeated the route given 
by Davis and again asked if she was sure that that was where they 
had driven# which she affirmed (T. 97). 
After the defense rested, the prosecutor informed the 
Court that he anticipated some rebuttal and requested a recess in 
order to locate a witness (T. 114). After approximately 15-20 
minutes, the witness had not been located and defendant moved 
that evidence be closed (T. 115). The prosecutor further 
explained that after talking with a police officer who had given 
him a lead, he intended to call Richard Miller of the Utah 
Department of Transportation, who he believed would testify that 
the route given by Brenda Davis was unavailable on May 11, 1987 
(T. 117-18). The court denied defendant's motion to close the 
evidence and took its noon recess (T. 119). Mr. Miller 
testified, over defendant's objection, that from April 13th to 
June 17th# 1987, SR-65, the only road between Parley's Way and 
Emigration Canyon was closed and unnavigable (T. 124-129). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted and published into 
evidence the photograph of defendant that had been used by the 
victim, Maureen Leavitt, to initially identify defendant as her 
attacker. This photograph had substantial probative value in 
rebutting defendant's theory that Leavitt'8 statement upon seeing 
the photograph: "This looks like the man that beat me" could be 
interpreted to mean that her initial identification was 
unreliable and subsequent positive and immediate identifications 
of defendant were linked to the initial photograph and not to the 
attack. It was necessary for the jury to see the photograph so 
that they could determine that the actual reason for Leavitt's 
statement was due to the fact that the photograph showed a 
younger picture of defendant than at the time Leavitt came upon 
him in her hallway. Thus, under Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, admission of the photograph into evidence was 
proper. 
Secondly, the court properly allowed the State to 
locate and offer rebuttal testimony to discredit a statement made 
by one of defendant's alibi witnesses. Until this witness 
testified on cross examination the State had no idea of the 
usefulness of such rebuttal testimony. The State notified 
defendant of the witness and his potential testimony as soon as 
was practicable, thus no violation of Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-2 
(1982) occurred. Additionally, although defendant knew of the 
possibility of requesting a continuance in such circumstances, he 
failed to do so apparently because he felt that the testimony was 
not crucial. Defendant should not now be able to claim that such 
testimony is reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S 
PHOTOGRAPH. 
A. Admission Of The Photograph Was Proper 
Because It Established Defendant's Identity. 
The State agrees with defendant that this Court has 
consistently excluded evidence of prior crimes when the relevance 
of such acts to the matter at hand is overcome by the prejudicial 
effect that such evidence may have on the jury. See e.g., State 
v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 813 
(1986) (evidence of other crimes admissible to prove a specific 
element of present alleged crime; inadmissible simply to show 
criminal propensity); State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) 
(evidence of prior crimes inadmissible unless reason other than 
to show criminal disposition); State v. Holder, 694 P.2d 583 
(Utah 1984) (evidence of another crime must be used with extreme 
caution because of potential prejudicial effect); and State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) (evidence of prior convictions 
could come before jury under the limited purpose to challenge the 
credibility if defendant testified). In fact, Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1988) explains: 
This Court's decisions have consistently 
recognized that an accused is almost 
certainly prejudiced unfairly when evidence 
of unrelated crimes or bad acts is introduced 
because of "the tendency of a fact finder to 
convict the accused because of bad character 
rather than because he [or she] is shown to 
be guilty of the offenses charged." [quoting 
from Saunders at 741]. • .M "such evidence 
is presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason 
for the admission of the evidence other than 
to show criminal disposition, the evidence is 
excluded.11 Id. 
Bishop/ at 496. 
Nevertheless, certain reasons may overcome the 
prejudicial presumption and evidence of prior crimes or bad acts 
may be admissible. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) 
provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless preservation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Conversely, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs any 
possible prejudice, the evidence is admissible. Rule 404(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) directs: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or action. 
Admission of the photograph in the case at hand does not violate 
Rule 403 and existing case law. The photograph objected to in 
this case was not offered to show the criminal disposition of 
defendant nor to prejudice the jury. Its purpose was to rebut 
defendant's strategic implications that Leavitt's initial 
identification was uncertain and that her subsequent selection of 
defendant as her attacker from the photo display, the line-up, 
the preliminary hearing, and the trial in question resulted from 
repeated confrontations with defendant's photo or person rather 
than from her memory of her attacker. Even assuming that the 
photograph might have been considered evidence of a prior 
conviction its use for purposes of identity falls directly within 
the exception of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404(b). Any 
prejudicial effect of the photograph was greatly outweighed by 
its probative value to place in context Leavitt's initial 
identification of defendant as her assailant. 
When the State, outside the presence of the jury, 
proposed the admission of the photograph of defendant which had 
been removed from the black binder of 30-50 photographs initially 
used by Leavitt in identifying defendant as her attacker, defense 
counsel stated: 
Our question in the case is that when in fact 
she picked that picture, she was not certain, 
but as she saw more and more pictures or 
personal appearances by Mr. Albretsen, it 
became cemented in her mind. It's common 
sense that would be our position from the 
questions we have asked. To bring this 
picture in is unnecessary and prejudicial. 
(T. 68). 
It was precisely for the reasons stated by defendant 
that the photograph's probative value outweighs any possible 
prejudice. Defendant interpreted Leavitt's statement that: 
-This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39) at the time she 
picked defendant's photo from the binder as meaning that Leavitt 
"had an impression that caused her to pick a picture tentatively, 
and she has become convinced over time, so she's mistaken" 
(defendant's closing argument, (T. 163)). The State argued that 
Leavitt's statement to her husband was explained by the fact that 
it was not a recent picture, and that the difference between the 
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photographic representation of defendant which Leavitt identified 
and the real-life attacker in her hallway which she subsequently 
reidentified as defendant in a variety of settings would 
logically elicit the statement that: "This looks like the man 
that beat me." Such a question of semantic interpretation could 
only be settled by the jury with the aid of the photo so heavily 
questioned by defendant. 
As defendant suggests, this Court has not yet 
determined that specific issue of this case; i.e. whether "mug 
shots" are admissible to corroborate identification testimony. 
However, Utah decisions have closely approached the matter. In a 
forgery prosecution, State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 (Utah 1964), a 
grocery store manager testified on direct examination that the 
defendant had cashed a money order at the store. Defense counsel 
casted doubt on the witness' perceptive abilities. On redirect 
examination, the prosecutor elicited from the manager the fact 
that within two or three days of the crime, he picked the 
defendant's picture from a group of mug shots. The defendant's 
photo, along with the others, was introduced into evidence 
without any objection. On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
only issue in the case was identification. Since the manager had 
identified the defendant in court on direct, so the argument ran, 
the testimony about the mug shots was unnecessary and could only 
carry the implication that the defendant associated with 
criminals, and thus prejudiced him in the minds of the jury. 
This Court held that* "The pictures were offered and received in 
evidence. No objection was made to any of this testimony nor to 
the receipt in evidence of the pictures. However, under the 
facts of this case we are of the opinion that such evidence was 
admissible on the issue of identification." Id. at 798 (footnote 
omitted). 
As defendant points out, cases such as People v. 
Aguirre, 158 Cal.App.2d 304, 322 P.2d 478 (1958) and People v. 
Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960), upon 
which the Owens court relied, stand for the general proposition 
that extra-judicial identification is admissible to corroborate 
identification or to serve as independent evidence of 
identification. See Gould, 354 P.2d at 867. However, there is 
no reason that Owens should be limited to a reading that only 
testimony about such corroborative or independent identification 
is allowed. Equally unpersuasive is defendant's argument that 
Owens be narrowly limited because subsequent cases such as State 
v. Jiron, 492 P.2d 983 (Utah 1972) in which Owens was cited, 
interpreted Owens as holding that "the testimony of a witness as 
to his extra-judicial identification of a defendant was 
admissible. Jiron, at 984. Since the issue in Jiron was 
specifically whether the testimony about extra-judicial 
idenfication was properly admitted, there was no need to expound 
upon Owens beyond the point necessary to rule on the specific 
issue in Jiron. Admission of the actual photographs was not an 
iasue in Jiron. 
Several other jurisdictions have resolved the question 
of whether photographs, specifically "mug shots," may be admitted 
for identification purposes. In People v. Travier# 197 N.W.2d 
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890 (Mich. App. 1972), a defendant claimed that it was 
prejudicial to allow the jury to see his mug shot. The Court of 
Appeals of Michigan held: 
it would be better if the jury was not 
allowed to see mug shots of the defendant. 
However, where, as here, defense counsel has 
made an issue of the witness's ability to 
recognize the defendant from the picture he 
was shown by the police, it was not improper 
for the trial court to admit the photos 
. . . . The court did its best to disguise 
the portions of the pictures making them 
recognizable as mug shots. We find no error 
in the admission of the exhibits. . . . 
Travier, at 892 (citation omitted). Similary, defendant here 
suggested that Leavitt had "difficulties with identification" (T. 
151) which was revealed in her statement: "This looks like the 
man that beat me" (T. 39). Therefore, the photograph was 
necessary to show that it was an outdated but identifiable 
likeness of defendant and thus substantiate her initial 
identification. The jury could not decide whether Leavitt's 
identification of defendant was faulty without viewing the 
photographs she used to identify him. By raising the* issue 
himself, defendant invited the State's rebuttal offer of the 
photos. The trial judge properly allowed the State to 
rehabilitate its witness by explaining the circumstances of her 
identification. 
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, a defendant claimed that the admission of his Mmug shot" 
iiv conjunction with the testimony of an identification witness 
was prejudicial error. United States v. Johnson, 495 F.2d 378 
(4th Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 860 (1974). The court 
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noted that the photograph had been taped over and the jury was 
instructed to draw no inferences therefrom, and then held that 
because the photo "had legitimate probative relevance to 
demonstrate the difference in Lee's appearance at the time of 
trial as compared to the time of a prior photographic 
identification" it was admissible, ^d. at 384. 
Further, in People v. Byrd, 357 N.E.2d 174 (111. App. 
1976), the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in 
admitting a "mug shot" and allowing the jury to take it into the 
jury room during deliberations. The court's description of that 
case could be easily substituted for this one: 
The central issue at the trial was the 
accuracy of the defendant's identification. 
His counsel attempted to cast doubt upon this 
identification in every way he could. One of 
the ways he tried to do so was to show that 
Latimore hesitated when first shown the 
picture. Latimore's explanation for the 
hesitation was that there was a difference 
between Byrd's appearance in the 1969 picture 
and his appearance at the time of the crimes 
and at the trial. Whether this was so became 
an issue at the trial. Its importance was 
emphasized in the final arguments of both 
sides. • • • 
Here the issue was whether Latimore's failure 
to quickly and positively identify Byrd as 
the third assailant from the 2-year old 
photograph destroyed or injured the 
credibility of his later lineup and in-court 
identifications. The photograph was relevant 
to this issue and the court correctly 
received it in evidence. And given the 
importance of the issue which confronted the 
jury, the court ruled correctly in allowing 
it to view the photograph. 
Id. at 178. 
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Lastly, in Irby v. Statef 429 So.2d 1179 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1983), the court rejected a claim that admission of a "mug 
shot" was reversible error. The questioned photograph originated 
from a group of pictures shown to the witness which resulted in 
the initial identification. Because the defendant attempted to 
impeach the witness's identification, the court admitted the 
photograph "to verify Witness Epp's prior out-of-court 
identification and to strengthen and corroborate her testimony 
and in-court identification." Ici. at 1183. Additionally, the 
court noted that where the defense is alibi (as it was in this 
case), identification is a material issue and a photograph shown 
by police officers to the victim or witness who identified him is 
admissible. Id. 
Defendant claims that in light of Leavitt's in-court 
identification of defendant as her attacker, admission of the 
photograph was cumulative and precluded under Rule 403 and Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Defendant's brief at 12-
13). However, upon close examination, defendant's two supporting 
cases are distinguishable. In Commonwealth v. Troweryf 235 A,2d 
171 (Pa.Super. 1967), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
determined that the admission of a "rogues gallery photograph" 
into evidence for the purpose of identification was reversible 
error. Yet it appears that the photograph in Trowery was offered 
in-the State's case-in-chief to establish identity with no 
indication that there was an alibi defense or an attempt by the 
defendant to discredit the witness's identification, as occurred 
in this case. 
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Similarly, in State v, Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258 (Hawaii Ct. 
App. 1980), the court found that the photographs "were introduced 
not to rebut any inferences of unreliability as to Gunderson's 
identification of appellants, but to simply establish his 
pretrial identification of her as part of the prosecution's case-
in-chief. Indeed, the admission of the photographs into evidence 
after Gunderson made an unequivocal in-court identification of 
appellants was unnecessary." Id. at 263. Implicit in this 
statement is that if the photos had been introduced to rebut 
inferences of reliability as to the identification, the court 
would have allowed their admission. It is exactly for this 
reason that the photographs were introduced in this case. Thus# 
the ruling in Kutzen is at least distinguishable, if not 
favorable to the State's position. 
The photograph here was not merely cumulative evidence 
of identification, used to establish guilt, or produced to 
tarnish the jury's perception of defendant. Rather, it was 
highly probative to explain Leavitt's reaction when she initially 
identified defendant as her attacker and to rebut defendant's 
theory that subsequent identifications were linked to the initial 
photo instead of the actual attacker. Thus, any possible 
prejudice from the photograph's admission into evidence did not 
substantially outweigh its probative value and the trial court's 
admission of the evidence should be affirmed. 
Finally, defendant did not object to admission of the 
photo array, Exhibit 8, once it was masked with tape to cover any 
booking references, of the persons involved (R. 51; T. 41). 
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Exhibit 9 is similarly masked. Moreover, Leavitt had already 
testified, and defendant had emphasized, that she identified her 
attacker from a binder of photographs provided to her by the 
investigating officer three days after the crime. If the jury 
was likely to infer that defendant's photo was a "mug shot" and 
evidence of prior crimes or bad acts, they were just as likely to 
do so from the testimony as they were from actually viewing the 
photograph. Thus, even if it was error to admit the actual photo, 
it was harmless. This is especially true where defendant 
strategically chose to emphasize Leavitt#s identification and the 
process surrounding it. 
B. Procedures Used By The Trial Court To 
Minimize Any Possible Prejudicial Effect Of 
The Photograph Were Proper And Effective. 
Although the trial court excluded the black binder of 
30-50 photographs from evidence (R. 51), subsequent events during 
trial necessitated admission of the photograph from the binder 
from which Leavitt initially identified defendant by her words: 
wThis looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39). In a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury, the State proffered the 
questioned photograph, Exhibit 9, which had been taped over to 
conceal any evidence of prior convictions or bad acts and 
proposed that it be admitted into evidence (T. 67). Argument 
ensued concerning the nature of the picture as a "mug shot" and 
the possible prejudice that its admission could cause (T. 67-72)• 
The court admitted the photograph, noting that the photo display 
of six pictures which were of the same nature had already been 
admitted [without objection to the taping over the bottom of the 
pictures or the origin of the photographs] (T. 72). In fact, 
during defendant's objections to the admission of the photograph 
from the black binder, defendant described the case as one "that 
has been relatively clean where there as been no prejudicial 
error" and then proceeded to argue that the questioned "mug shot" 
should not be admitted because of prejudice, although the other 
photographs were not considered prejudicial error (T. 69). 
It should be noted again that the photograph was highly 
probative. The State's actions in limiting possible prejudice by 
removing the photograph from the binder, covering any booking 
information that may have appeared on the photograph, and moving 
for its admission only after requesting that the jury be excused, 
should not be construed as an attempt to discredit or prejudice 
defendant, but as a commendable effort to do all in its power to 
limit the jury's attention to the possibly prejudicial nature of 
the photograph. 
Although this Court has not specifically determined 
what measures should be taken to prepare a "mug shot" that must 
be admitted into evidence because of its high probative value, 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) states that "if 
McCardell had made his specific objection concerning the 
information on the back of [the "mug shot"] known to the trial 
court, the court could have rejected all five individual 
photographs and admitted only the group photo, or taken steps to 
cover or remove the information on the back of exhibit 10 so as 
to ensure that it would not be available for the jury's 
inadvertent discovery" (emphasis added). JId. at 947. 
Courts from several other jurisdictions have directly 
ruled on this issue. In United States v. De Sena# 490 F.2d 692 
(2nd Cir. 1973), "mug shots" were introduced following testimony 
about a prior photographic identification. The Court noted that 
such evidence may undermine a defendant's right to a fair trial 
in certain circumstances, but concluded that because the bottoms 
of the pictures had been taped over with the word "evidence" 
written on the tape, the taping was performed outside the 
presence of the jury, and the pictures were not introduced in a 
prejudicial manner, there was no error requiring reversal. 
The editing of the photograph in this case equals that 
in De Sena. Additionally, it was introduced to rebut defendant's 
inferences on cross examination that Ms. Leavitt's identification 
was tainted by viewing this very photograph. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. 
Fulcher, 243 S.E.2d 338 (N.C. 1978), also determined that 
admission of five pairs of photographs used during the pre-arrest 
identification process which depicted front and side views of the 
defendant and four others, from which prison numbers had been 
removed but in which chains around the subjects' necks remained 
visible, was not prejudicial error where the defendant had 
challenged the propriety of the pre-arrest identification 
process. Although the question went to the propriety of the 
process used in that case rather than to its reliability, the 
court determined that, even though the jury could infer that the 
defendant had had prior criminal contact with the police from the 
cropped photos, their probative value was sufficient to outweigh 
any potential prejudice. This reasoning is also persuasive in 
this case where the photo display had already been admitted 
without objection, the questioned photograph did not leave tell-
tale signs such as a visible chain around defendant's neck, and 
the need for its admission was equally probative. 
In Walker v. State, 473 So.2d 694 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 
1985), remanded on other grounds, Walker v. State, 499 So.2d 884 
(1986) the defendant also challenged the admission of photographs 
showing frontal and profile views which had been sued for pre-
trial identification. The court noted that "[t]he photographs 
were taped so that dates and numbers were 'cropped out,' and the 
photographs made no explicit reference to prior criminal 
activity, . . . " and then affirmed their admission. Ici. at 698. 
Other courts have also allowed photographic evidence of 
defendants although the picture displays a frontal and profile 
view. See e.g. Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 
1985) (although it may have been preferable to separate the 
frontal and profile views, where the photographs bore no markings 
which would identify them with police files, they were 
admissible); Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass. 
1983) (where trial judge used every other reasonable means to 
eliminate prejudice, failure to separate frontal and profile 
views of mug shot was not prejudicial error); and Futrell v. 
Wyrick, 716 F.2d 1207 (8th Cir. 1983) (failure to separate poses 
orr mug shot that was introduced into evidence did not amount to 
prejudicial error). Similarly, in the present case, the 
photograph consisted of a frontal and profile view; however, all 
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references to any police contact were covered, no suggestion was 
made before the jury that the photograph was a "mug shot", and 
there was significant probative value for its inclusion. 
Defendant asserts that several cases condemn mug shots 
as inherently prejudicial and that attempts to mask or otherwise 
edit matter that might link the photograph to prior criminal 
contact are futile or even counter-productive. However, a close 
reading reveals the more specific bases of prejudice in these 
cases. Barnes v. United States, 365 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1966), 
cited by defendant, states that w[t]he rudimentary tape cover . . 
. neither disguised the nature of the picture nor avoided the 
prejudice. . . ." Ici. at 511. But the court further reveals that 
the tape was placed on the picture after it was shown to the 
witness in the presence of the jury, after defense counsel had 
objected to its introduction, also in the presence of the jury, 
and only following a short conference at the bench was the tape 
affixed and the photograph admitted so that the judge could have 
"a chance to try it out, so that the Court of Appeals can rule." 
Id. at 510. Additionally, the Barnes court relied on an Indiana 
case in which a similar exhibit was not allowed because it had 
little or no probative value. Id. at 511, citing Vaughn v. State, 
215 Ind. 142, 19 N.E.2d 239, 241 (1939). 
The present case differs in several important respects 
from Barnes and Vaughn. The photograph was probative to rebut 
defendant's implications of a faulty identification, the covering 
was not rudimentary, nor was it shown to the witness before it 
was masked, discussions about its admissibility were held out of 
the jury's presence and it was admitted in a manner that did not 
arouse the suspicion of the jury. Although cases such as People 
v. Buqarin, 507 P.2d 879 (Colo. 1973) criticize the use of mug 
shots regardless of efforts to remove references to prior 
criminal dealings, no discussion is devoted to situations such as 
the case at hand in which the defendant's strategy greatly 
increases the probative value of the photograph. Such a general 
presumption of prejudice should not preclude the introduction of 
mug shots under the circumstances at hand. 
Richardson v. Statef 536 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Crim. 1976) 
was reversed because the trial judge determined that there was no 
way to disguise a mug shot, so he allowed the photograph into 
evidence with all markings visibly displayed. The appeals court 
pointed out that mug shots, nonetheless, had been introduced 
without error in Texas cases where no objection was made, and 
also where prejudicial identification had been effectively 
removed. JId. at 223. Because prejudicial identification was 
successfully removed in this case as well, it is distinguishable 
from Richardson. 
Also, in People v. Carroll, 61 A.D.2d 760, 402 N.Y.S.2d 
8 (1978) although the court stated that the taping over of the 
prison numerals on the defendant's chest in that mug shot may 
have emphasized the photo's nature, it also stated that had it 
been properly redacted, the photo may have been probative. Id. at 
8-3. The court there did not specify what proper redaction 
entails. The other cases cited above, however, indicate that the 
editing of the photographs in this case was sufficient. 
Finally, in People v. Clark, 297 N.E.2d 395 (111. App. 
1973) the mug shot was not sufficiently disguised to conceal all 
writing which connected the defendant with his prior criminal 
history. On one pose something had been blocked out and on the 
other lettering remained. Arguably it was this insufficient 
editing which "could only lead the jury to speculate as to what 
information the deleted portion of the photograph had contained," 
and the court's opinion should not be expanded to require 
exclusion of all edited photos. 
Defendant's final contention that the masking was used 
in order to suggest that the photograph was taken incident to the 
current offense (defendant's brief at 17) is not well-taken. The 
photo originated from a black binder already in the possession of 
the police and, as was testified by Leavitt, was used for initial 
identification (T. 38). From the fact that the origin of the 
photograph was mentioned early in the trial, without objection, a 
sophisticated juror may have already presumed that the defendant 
had had previous contact with the police in order for them to 
have his picture. The admission of the photograph added very 
little to the information already possessed by the jury about the 
possibility that defendant had previously encountered 
difficulties with law enforcement. In any event, the 
photograph's possible inferential prejudicial effect was 
substantially less than its probative value. 
C. ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPH USED BY 
LEAVITT FOR INITIAL IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES 
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR, IF IT WAS ERROR. 
Even if it is possible that the jury's perception of 
defendant may have been that he was previously known to law 
enforcement officials, it is unlikely that this perception 
contributed to their decision in this case. The admission of the 
photograph used by Leavitt in her initial identification of her 
attacker was not directed at this perception, but rather 
presented to rebut defendant's implications that Leavitt's 
identification of him as her assailant was keyed to the 
photograph and not the attack. When Leavitt made the statement 
"This looks like the man that beat me" (T. 39) she did so because 
the photograph that she saw was not recent, not because she could 
not positively identify the man in her home that she looked at 
face to face for three seconds before he began his attack (T. 21, 
56, 169-171). 
That the admission of the photograph does affect the 
credibility of defendant's alibi does not make its admission 
error. The State is not prevented from attacking the credibility 
of the alibi a defendant offers. In fact, the alibi defense 
suggests that the victim's identification is mistaken and raises 
the issue of her credibility, thus making the photograph highly 
probative to the issue of identity and, therefore, admissible. 
Defendant further suggests that the State failed to 
mtffet the two criteria of State v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487 (2d 
Cir. 1973) that (1) no prior criminal record must be implied by 
the photographs, and (2) the jury's attention should not be drawn 
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to the source or implications of the photographs by the manner in 
which they are introduced. Although these criteria are not 
controlling, they were met. Unlike the picture in Johnson v. 
Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 303 (Va. App. 1986), in which the mug 
shot's legend was visible, the legend on the photograph here was 
masked and there were no implications of any prior convictions of 
the defendant. Thus, the first prong was satisfied. 
Additionally, when the photograph was introduced, questioning was 
limited to foundation, specifically tailored only to identify the 
photograph, as was requested by defendant and ordered by the 
court (T. 72, 73). No reference was made to the photograph as a 
"mug shot", as was found to be error in State v. Moore, 495 P.2d 
445 (Ariz. 1972), no argument on admissibility was heard by the 
jury, and the photograph was admitted and published with as 
little fanfare as other exhibits in the case. 
The probative value of the photograph substantially 
outweighed its potential for prejudice in this case, and thus, in 
accordance with Rule 403 its admission was not reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TESTIMONY OF RICHARD MILLER WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AS REBUTTAL EVIDENCE AND DID NOT 
DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS. 
Prior to trial, on May 27, 1987, Detective Hutchison 
contacted Brenda Davis, with whom defendant was living at the 
time of the offense, and obtained a handwritten statement in 
which Davis claimed to be with defendant at the time of the crime 
(R. 2313. 225, Addendum). In part, Davis wrote that they had 
"gone up into the mountains for a ride, into to [sic] Parlsey 
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[sic] Way and Emingation [sic] Canyan [sic].M (R. 225, Addendum). 
When defendant questioned Davis concerning where she and 
defendant had gone after she picked her son up from school, she 
simply stated, "we went for a ride up into Parley's Way and 
Immigration [sic] Canyon*1 (T. 86). On cross examination/ the 
State questioned Davis in greater depth in several areas. The 
State inquired as to the real relationship between Davis and 
defendant (T. 92-93) and questioned the time frame between the 
end of her relationship with defendant and the beginning of a new 
live-in relationship (T. 94). The sequence of events of May 11, 
was precisely established (T. 95). Then, the State questioned 
Davis concerning the exact route taken by her and defendant as 
they left her mother's shop and travelled into the canyons (T. 
96-97). Next, the State asked Davis to specify what she had 
eaten for lunch that day# and what she ate the next week—both of 
which she remembered with precision (T. 97-98). And the 
questioning continued in detail concerning the rest of the day's 
travels, the invitation given to her friend to come by for 
dinner, and the reasons for the bicycle ride to her friend's home 
(T. 98-100). Following this specific questioning, the State 
inquired: 
Q. Is everything you told us the truth today? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Every last thing? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Every part of it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You're confident and sure that's what happened? 
A. I am positive. 
(T. 101). 
Davis testified next that she told Detective Hutchison that she 
loved defendant and that she was going to help him in e*very way 
she could. The purpose for this extensive and detailed 
questioning was to discredit Davis's alibi testimony by showing 
that her feelings for defendant affected her credibility/ that 
her testimony was too precise to be believable, or by eliciting 
enough specificity that another alibi witness or a rebuttal 
witness could contradict her testimony. The State's suspicion of 
Davis's credibility is evidenced in a later statement made by the 
prosecutor in the judge's chambers following the noon recess that 
"The police talked to that witness and had a statement that is in 
verbatim what she testified to on the stand" (T. 124). The State 
did know before trial, then, that it was going to attempt to 
discredit Davis; but did not, as defendant suggests, hide 
rebuttal testimony and set the stage for a surprise witness. 
Rather Davis's credibility was suspect, and all avenues were 
being explored for the purpose of discrediting her. Until Davis 
took the stand and described the exact route, the State did not 
know that she would necessarily be discreditable. Apparently, 
the prosecutor was not aware that the route was possibly 
inaccessible until someone suggested it to him during trial. 
Had the State been prepared with a surprise witness as 
defendant suggests, it seems logical that it would not have 
required from 11:15 a.m. to 1*45 p.m. to locate and bring the 
witness into the courtroom (T. 115-119). In fact, the State 
explained to the court the manner in which the witness was 
procured, "Your Honor, the defense finished with their two 
rebuttal witnesses approximately 15 minutes ago. Since that time 
I talked with my police officer who gave me a lead as to a person 
we want to use as a rebuttal, a Mr. Miller, who works for the 
Department of Transportation" (T. 115). This dialogue reveals 
that the rebuttal witness was not planned and hidden, but 
suddenly discovered. Even when the prosecutor reported to 
defendant that he believed the witness would testify that the 
route said to have been taken by Davis was closed to travel at 
the time, there was still uncertainty as to Miller's exact 
testimony (T. 117). There is no evidence that the prosecutors 
knew for certain that the road Davis claimed to have travelled 
was closed, only that the prosecutor suspected that it was 
closed. 
Defendant cites Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) 
for the proposition that M[t]he State may not insist that trials 
be run as a 'search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are 
concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own 
witnesses.*1 ^d. at 475. However, in People v. Gillman, 239 
N.W.2d 396, 400 (Mich. App. 1976) the Court of Appeals of 
Michigan stated, "we do not believe that the Wardius case was 
intended to apply to prosecution witnesses called only for the 
purpose of impeaching an alibi witness's credibility." The 
rationale behind this statement is: 
Now, if the people had somebody who was 
going to testify that they saw the defendant 
at a different place or at the scene of the 
crime, then I think they have a duty to 
notify the defendant of that after an alibi 
is placed on the record. 
• • • 
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Now, the question here is whether or not 
somebody can testify to rebut the witnesses' 
story to show that perhaps they aren't 
credible rather than place the defendant at 
the scene at the time. . . . 
Gillman at 399. The court basically found a difference between a 
rebuttal witness that would directly refute the alibi and was 
required to be discovered and a rebuttal witness used solely to 
discredit the alibi testimony. 
This same reasoning was applied in Williams v. State, 
437 A.2d 665 (Md. App. 1982). In that case, the defendant's 
alibi was that he had been at his girlfriend's apartment from 
11:00 p.m. until the next morning, and the murder occurred at 
3:45 a.m. He testified that when he had arrived at her 
apartment, "Barney Miller" was on the television. In rebuttal, 
the State called a television company executive who testified 
that "Barney Miller" was not on television at all during the 
night in question. The court explained: 
It is perfectly clear that the rebuttal 
evidence did naught but impeach the 
credibility of appellant, who had sought to 
embellish his ability to recall by reciting a 
fact related to his recollection of time and 
place. It did not go to prove that appellant 
was not present at the time and place he 
intended to establish by his alibi. It 
simply indicated that his memory of what 
occurred at that place at an earlier time was 
faulty. 
Id. at 670. 
The testimony of Miller in this case was also limited 
to the issue of Davis' credibility concerning the route taken in 
the canyons. Miller did not testify that he had seen defendant 
somewhere else, which may have required extensive investigation 
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and surrebuttal testimony. He simply informed the jury that the 
road between the two canyons was inaccessible on that day. The 
testimony implied that Ms. Davis' recall of when she and 
defendant drove into the canyon or where they had driven was 
inaccurate, not that they had not been driving together. 
Additionally, the State did not spring this surprise 
testimony on defendant as seems to have been the case in 
Williams, but apprised defendant of the possible testimony as 
soon as it was discovered/ thus, complying with the statutory 
requirement that "the defendant and prosecuting attorney shall be 
under a continuing duty to disclose the names and addresses of 
additional witnesses which come to the attention of either party 
after filing their alibi witness lists." Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-
2(2)(1982). 
In State v. Madera, 670 P.2d 552 (Mont. 1983) the 
defendant also claimed that the district court erred in allowing 
surprise rebuttal testimony in violation of the statute which 
required prior notice of such witnesses. After finding that the 
State had no way of knowing what the alibi witness would reveal 
in his testimony, and that the defendant was given an opportunity 
to question the witness before the rebuttal testimony (which 
offer defense counsel refused), the court allowed the testimony. 
On appeal in that case, as in the present matter, the State 
claimed that it gave notice of the witness at the earliest 
practicable time, and the defendant claimed he was denied due 
process and cited to Wardius. The court found that good cause 
had been shown due to the evidentiary developments during trial 
to allow the State to add to its rebuttal list. 
Further, the Madera court ruled that "If surprise is 
claimed by the other party, the proper procedure when unrevealed 
witnessed are added is to ask for a continuance so that 
preparation may be made." 670 P.2d at 556. As in that case, 
defendant here failed to request a continuance. Defendant was 
well aware of this option, as is evidenced in the statement, "If 
we locate this person and if he's relevant as a rebuttal witness, 
which I have no idea of knowing how he would be at this point, 
then I would need a further continuance to interview him and then 
to find rebuttal witnesses—surrebuttal, if necessary, because 
it's a complete surprise, anything that he will say at this time" 
(T. 116). However, when the witness had been procured and his 
potential testimony revealed, defendant did not request a 
continuance, and even argued that "It's not a crucial issue to 
this case that he should be allowed to put on because some great 
prejudice will accrue to the State if he doesn't" (T. 123), (See 
also T. 118, 122). Defendant should not now be allowed to decide 
that the issue was indeed crucial to him and benefit thereby when 
counsel affirmatively determined not to request a continuance. 
This Court has previously noted that failure to request 
a continuance when surprise is claimed as grounds for excluding a 
witness tends to negate the claim of surprise. State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, n.6 (Utah 1987). While Knight resulted in reversal 
for failure to provide timely discovery, it is distinguishable 
from this case* In Knight, counsel requested a continuance to 
meet the surprise testimony but it was denied. Further, the 
prosecutor had told defense counsel only 3 days prior to trial 
that he could not locate the witnesses and knew, when he did 
locate them, that defense counsel was interested in talking with 
them. In this case, the prosecutor did not know of the existence 
of the witness or his usefulness until the time of his request 
for a continuance to locate the witness. Because defendant did 
not request a continuance and the prosecutor did not withhold 
information from him, the trial court properly admitted the 
evidence over defendant's objection. See also LaMere v. Risley, 
827 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1987) citing United States v. Krohn, 
558 F.2d 390, 394 (8th Cir.) (defendant's failure to ask for 
continuance undermines his claim of unfair surprise), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 868, 98 S.Ct. 207, 54 L.Ed.2d 145 (1977). 
The prosecutor provided defendant with the name and 
substance of testimony of the rebuttal witness as soon as he 
discovered the witness' existence. He explained that he did not 
know he could attack Davis' credibility on this issue until she 
testified. Even defense counsel admitted that she had not 
previously thought of this angle (T. 122). Defendant neglected 
to request a continuance, although claiming that the witness was 
a surprise and that defendant was unprepared to adequately 
respond to the possible testimony. In the face of the State's 
compliance and defendant's lack of action, defendant should not 
now be allowed to claim a violation of due process for failure to 
exclude the evidence where defense counsel attempted to exclude 
it?by arguing that it was not crucial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
DATED this 9 ^ day of March, 1989, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
i^i 
SANDRA L. S#3C 
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